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INTRODUCTION   
National income is one of the benchmarks for the 
country's economic indicator. It is hoped that the 
correct calculation of national income will be able to 
contribute to the national economy and identify which 
sectors contribute to the development and which ones 
need to be strengthened sectors in order to support 
the social development. Underground economic 
practices are an important part of numerous countries, 
both developed and emerging. Economic operations 
are carried out both lawfully and unlawfully, the latter 
of which are not detected in the calculation of national 
income/GDP (Schneider & Hametner, 2014). During 
the 2001-2013 period, Indonesia's underground 
economic growth was 8.33% of GDP. As a result, there 
is a possible revenue deficit of 11,172.86 billion 
rupiahs, or around 1% of GDP, which covers market 
output of legitimate and illicit products and services 
that are exported or purchased illegally (Samuda, 
2016).  
Based on the findings of Feige (1990), the 
underground economy is classified into four groups: 
(i) the illegal economy: commercial activity that breaks 
laws such as the selling of stolen goods, slavery, 
smuggling, bribery, trafficking and drugs, (ii) the 
unreported economy: failure to disclose income to the 
tax authority concerned, (iii) an unrecorded economy: 
lack of statistical evidence on income for the 
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ABSTRACT 
Underground economic activity is a phenomenon that requires special and 
continuous treatment. This phenomenon is counterproductive to local revenues 
and is related to corrupt practices and tax evasion. The research was conducted 
in Bengkayang Regency, West Kalimantan Province, Indonesia. The qualitative 
phenomenological method was carried out by interviewing underground 
economic actors such as liquor producers, "pangku" coffee shops, and street 
vendors. The findings indicate that corruption activities in the form of collecting 
bribes and offering bribes are carried out in cash without going through a legal 
transaction mechanism. The underground economy practices tax evasion, does 
business without a permit, pays substandard wages, and does not protect 
workers with insurance.  The underground economic activity will contribute to 
an increase in the circulation of money in society, but do not take into account 
the regional economy. Such situations call for massive supervision of individuals 
and the introduction of pentahelix elements to form synergies between actors 
and to begin to integrate and develop digital structures in every financial activity 
using e-government systems. 
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government and (iv) an informal economy: 
commercial actors that receive income without a 
business license, a job arrangement and a loan from 
an official financial institution (Azwar & Mulyawan, 
2017). Measuring the level of the underground 
economy is not an easy assignment with a challenging 
level of precision. Optimal fiscal policy related to tax 
collection and administration needs to be more 
positive and pro-economic actors so that they can 
become registered business actors for contributing to 
GDP and being the target be the subsidies policy of 
the SME (Small Medium Enterprises) industry 
(Asaminew, 2010). Underground economic activity is 
an enterprise that produces revenue beyond the 
knowledge of the tax authority with a view to tax 
evasion, and involves the informal sector and the black 
market, which is commonly referred to as the illegal 
market.   
The sluggishness of Indonesian SMEs is 
exacerbated by a range of social cognition errors. This 
social cognition is derived from cultural understanding 
shared in newspapers by the Indonesian government 
and citizens. There are perception-related 
shortcomings among market players, such as systemic 
philosophy, structuralism, and social learning. Due to 
the shortcomings of Indonesian SMEs, there is a need 
for collaborative research based on a philosophical 
approach to science. The low growth of SMEs in 
Indonesia is due to a lack of understanding among 
business players about how to build a business while 
considering social aspects such as salaries in 
compliance with government policy, employee health 
assurance, acceptable business practices and 
sufficient rewards for employees (Panjaitan et al., 
2020). 
Black markets were created as a result of overly 
rigid government controls and prohibitions on 
products entering the market. The unregulated market 
is illegal even with the lawful allocation of sales and 
market share. Production and distribution of products 
on the black market is illegal and violates state law. 
Illegal market descriptions are highly associated with 
informal sector activity such as small business units, 
self-employed employees, unregistered enterprises, 
low access to credit facilities, and position in border 
and peripheral regions (Faal, 2003).  
Tax management policies frequently fail to be 
implemented due to many factors such as the civil 
servants’ poor expertise in taxation, the indiscipline of 
business players, and mistrust of state agencies 
(Pravasanti, 2018). Fiscal policy commitment through 
moderate tax cuts and constant tight supervision will 
reduce the amount of underground economic activity 
and provide a boost for the regional economy, thus 
increasing regional government fiscal revenues (Orsi 
et al., 2014). The high level of tax pressures imposed 
on business players, the level of cash money supply, 
and unemployment add to increased tax evasion 
activity (Amoh & Adafula, 2019). 
The approach of raising tax rates is intended to 
raise the amount of government revenue.  However, 
this action will lead to future tax deviations and 
disincentive to the population in carrying out economic 
activities, thus enabling people to enter the 
underground economy (Azwar & Mulyawan, 2017). 
Increased underground economic growth will cause 
problems with poor fiscal decentralization policies and 
particularly growing regional economy in local level 
(Kanao et al., 2010). The general stereotype against 
performers in the underground economy is slum, 
filthy, disorderly, poor-ordered trade facility, 
unorganized business, unpleasant street vendors 
(Schneider, 2014).  This characterizes the condition of 
the economy segment, namely the relatively limited 
size of operation, local resource reliance, time and 
location versatility and relatively simple accessibility 
(Tanzi & Fund, 2014; Wa Ode, 2015). Unfortunately, 
this underground economy continues to grow and 
becomes the choice of underground economic actors 
to survive. Such constraints as low employment 
opportunities and low quality of human resources 
encourage many people to engage in informal work. 
There is a positive correlation between the degree 
of corruption and the actions of underground 
economic players, as shown by a limited circulation of 
money in a monetary point of view and the transaction 
value is not calculated by GDP. This can reduce state 
and local revenue accounts and show pseudo national 
economic activity. High levels of corruption diminish 
public confidence in government authorities, which 
can influence tax evasion and increase underground 
economic activity (Marè et al., 2020). The increasing 
activity of the underground economy in the form of 
bribery and criminal acts of corruption has worsened 
the image of law enforcement and the rule of law 
(Marliza Mohamed, 2012). 
The complex bureaucratic pressure makes 
underground economic players choose alternate 
routes in all areas and seek security to keep their 
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foresee and control the issue of underground 
economic crime, the government must be prepared to 
take decisive action relating to underground economic 
operations by partnering with industrial organizations 
to engage in digital technology (An & Kim, 2018). By 
enhancing the micro and small enterprises to access 
the global economy, the amount of underground 
economic activity will be reduced (Hoang, 2020).  The 
significance of an integrated framework between 
scientific disciplines, particularly law and crime,  with 
an integrated approach to deal with the actions of 
underground economic actors and bribery behavior 
(Andreev et al., 2018). 
To date, the activities of underground economic 
actors in Indonesia have not been clearly enforced and 
specified. It is important to address a continuous 
analysis in order to devise policies responding to the 
conditions of underground economic actors in each 
area of Indonesia. Some argue that the underground 
economy is a means of de-industrialization and social 
isolation, as shown by a decrease in social and 
individual freedoms, which leads to social inequality 
and poverty (Chotim et al., 2019).  
Many studies on underground economic estimation 
have been carried out. The underground economy 
estimates from the consumption side show an 
estimated yield equivalent to 40% of GDP. This 
amount indicates the existence of tax evasion business 
practices or hidden dishonest business practices that 
do not generate a contribution to GDP (Nizar & 
Purnomo, 2011). Findings by Faal (2003) using a 
monetary approach clarified that the economy was 
underground in Guyana from 1964 to 2000, in which 
the tax burden could change the market for currency 
by introducing a major tax component. Measurement 
of the scale of the underground economy gives rise to 
demand for variable currency-M1 (monetary money) 
as a result of the implementation of Tanzi's standard 
model of demand for money (Samuda, 2016). 
Theoretically, the bank interest rate would have a 
negative effect on the demand for money, which 
means that if there is a decline in the amount of 
demand for money, the public chooses to save money 
in the form of a deposit (Kristianto, 2019). However, 
the condition is different if the society chooses to 
circulate money for commercial activities rather than 
save it in the form of investments with the bigger 
return of the benefits compared to that which are used 
for business, even though the interest rate of the 
deposit rises (Furuoka & Munir, 2014). 
The research is aimed to estimate the underground 
economy in the border region. The research location 
was in Bengkayang Regency, West Kalimantan 
Province, Indonesia. This region borders the country 
of Malaysia, in particular the state of Sarawak on the 
island of Borneo. The underground economic potential 
in this region has been in the spotlight for a long time, 
implying opportunities for abuse of authority and 
corruption which affect regional growth. 
RESEARCH METHOD  
This study uses a qualitative phenomenological 
method, which is a technique to explain descriptions 
interpreted by an individual from his life experience 
holistically. This study observes the behavior of the 
underground economy business, the events 
experienced, and the responses or business 
processes. A triangulation method approach was used 
to collect evidence and data, which included in-depth 
interviews, participatory observations, and recordings 
in natural settings that were responsive to the 
respondent and research site. 
The research was conducted in Bengkayang 
Regency, West Kalimantan Province. It is the outer 
region of the province which is directly adjacent to the 
Sarawak state of Malaysia. The underground economy 
player was interviewed to elaborate on their 
characteristics related to the type of business, 
business experience, and the kind of illegal activities, 
such as the practice of paying retribution/taxes, 
bribery, illegal levies, and extortion. 
Respondents selection in this study is done based 
on the John W. Creswell approach, where the 
researcher chose respondents intentionally, and 
actively and thoroughly arranged respondents and 
places (documentation or visual material) to find more 
understanding and analysis of the problem being 
reviewed. The number of respondents in a 
heterogeneous group ranges from 3 to 15 people 
(Creswell, 2014). This study collected data from an 
unpublished respondent source. The selection of key 
respondents was done deliberately, related to the 
identification of locations and individuals/groups, 
including street vendors (legal and illegal), coffee 
shops, and liquor producers in Bengkayang market 
traditional. The survey selected eight key respondents 
(Table 1), including two coffee shops, two street 
vendors, two beer producers, and two wholesalers. 














regional contribution. They generally pay illegal fees 
without valid evidence for the purpose of maintaining 
the cleanliness and security of the area.  
 
Table 1. Respondents and Business Type 
Name Business Type  
A1 Coffee Shop 1 
A2 Coffee Shop 2 
A3 Street Vendor 1 
A4 Street Vendor 2 
A5 Liquor producer 1 
A6 Liquor producer 2 
A7 Grocery Store 1 











Figure 1. Analysis Method adapted from (Miles et al., 
2014). 
 
The data analysis method was carried out in a 
three-stage descriptive narrative, namely data 
reduction, data presentation and data verification to 
draw conclusions (Miles et al., 2014). The steps of the 
data processing can be seen in Figure 1.   
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Respondent Characteristics    
The underground economy is an activity that is 
difficult to quantify. However, some knowledge that 
refers to the definition or characteristics of 
underground economic actors can be found in the 
Bengkayang area for the purpose of the study (Table 
2). 
Table 2 shows that business actors had an 
educational background profile of Junior High School 
(SMP) and Senior High School (SMA). Workers work 
more than eight hours per day. The wages received by 
workers were less than the regional minimum wage in 
the Bengkayang area. Economic actors did not include 
workers in welfare or social security programs. 
Indonesia's low ownership of work-accident insurance 
and social security is impacted by the informal 
workers' level of education or understanding. Overall, 
labor accident insurance ownership among unskilled 
workers underground economy sector is relatively low 
(Madya & Nurwahyuni, 2019). 
Long and cumbersome bureaucracy and 
procedures make business players unwilling to apply 
for and register for business licenses for taxpayer ID 
(NPWP). This inefficient service is supposed to foster 
high levels of corruption and corruption along with 
weak institutional frameworks to assist underground 
economy improvement (Ouédraogo, 2017). 
Corruption cases must be taken care of with strict 
regulation, and make it standard for clean government 
performance in winning community trust (Berggren & 
Bjørnskov, 2020). Massive elimination of corruption 
must be done with a trustworthy government system 
and the anti-corruption committee (KPK) as an 
independent institution in prosecuting corruption 
cases (Samimi & Abedini, 2012). 
Underground Economy Activities      
The circumstances and practices of underground 
economic in relation to levies, unauthorized business 
licenses and taxes evasion are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Respondent Characteristics of Underground Economy Activity 
Properties A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 
Education level SMP SMP SMP SMP SMA SMA SMA SMA 
Wage level  <UMR <UMR <UMR <UMR <UMR <UMR <UMR <UMR 
Employee Social Security No No No No No No No No 
Working day (hours) >8 >8 >8 >8 >8 >8 >8 >8 
NPWP (taxpayer ID) No No No No No No No No 
Business license No No No No No No No No 
Retribution Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Business scale Micro Micro Micro Micro Micro Micro Micro Micro 
Total Manpower (person) <5 <5 <5 <5 <5 <5 <5 <5 
Length of working (years) >5 <5 >5 >5 <5 >5 <5 >5 
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Table 3. Data on Information Relating to Taxes and Licenses 
 Retribution Taxes/License 
A1 There is no change in the payment of the garbage/cleaning 
services, the shop area is always filthy. Service is a 
formality. 
There is no socialization on the issue of NPWP (taxpayer 
ID) and government business licenses, as well as the 
advantages of these taxes and the awareness of NPWP. 
A2 Overlapping the payment of dues, certain economic actors 
are exempt from paying payments relative to all economic 
actors. 
NPWP is found no required,  as there is little benefit.   
However if the company is in violation of the legislation, 
the business is likely moving instead 
A3 Support payments from officers as security money NPWP is not so necessary and useful 
A4 Food sector players are distinguished from coffee shops, 
with a 10% contribution from turnover. 
NPWP is not so essential and useful 
A5 The fees charged are voluntary donations, without 
pressure from the group involved, and the fees paid are 
meant for personal use, not for official purposes. Company 
typically allocate security services of between 200 and 300 
thousand per person. The commitment is made every 
month where the security forces coming in are between 
two and three people. 
NPWP and business licenses are not necessary because 
they believe that small companies are not taken into 
account.  Posibly, business are side enterprises of officials 
and members of the board of directors. 
A6 The advantage of paying security service, in the case of a 
raid is already given details from the unscrupulous. 
Company licenses do not exist because they sound 
cumbersome and bureaucratic in the administration. 
A7 Support payments from officers as security money NPWP is not so essential and useful 
A8 When there is a raid there is a notice from the apparatus, 
the payments will go to the Agency directly, not to the 
Agency. 
NPWP is not so essential and useful 
 
 
The underground economic activity begins with 
bribes by perpetrators, which are carried out in cash 
without going through a legal banking system. The 
transaction process can be carried out by providing 
fake receipts or intentionally eliminating evidence of 
recording interbank transactions. The transaction 
process is carried out by the team in charge of 
managing the field, after which the agreed bribe quota 
is distributed. Cash transactions can increase the 
supply of cash (Uslaner & Rothstein, 2016). Increased 
corruption will result in an increase in the circulation 
of money in society. Therefore, monitoring the 
circulation of individual money can be an option for 
extensive prevention of underground economic 
practices and tax evasion. The introduction of Penta 
helix elements is now possible to create synergies 
between stakeholders while starting to integrate and 
develop digitization structures in all financial activities 
using e-government payments and tax payment 
systems (Bhuiyan, 2011).  
Commodities entering the border are carried out 
via alternate routes at many locations in the forest 
connecting Malaysia with Indonesia. These goods 
might be in the form of drugs, craft splits (typical 
Dayak mats), motor cars and alcoholic drinks. This is 
done to avoid border or customs control. Although not 
backed by a centralized organizational framework, 
smugglers continue to operate successfully with the 
aid of ubiquitous contemporary communication 
technology, allowing them to connect rapidly and 
globally to share relevant information, leaving no 
trace. They work through a variety of relationships 
with people who are able to provide different services 
such as providers of local lodging and transportation, 
document forgers, corrupt authorities, transportation 
firms, and more. Many of these networks are ethnic 
(Içduygu & Toktas, 2002). 
In order to ascertain the underground economy's 
contribution to the regional economy of the border 
area, this study conducted interviews with actors from 
the underground economy, including grocery stores, 
street sellers, coffee shops, and liquor producers, each 
of which was represented by two business actors. The 
interviews found that the majority of respondents said 
that the motive for beginning a business was to make 
money. As such, the community operated a grocery 
store, market stands, coffee shops, and liquor 
producers in order to make ends meet. 
Research shows that the working hours imposed 
were not in accordance with applicable regulations. 
The underground economy business employed their 
workers more than eight hours a day. Respondents 
said that all grocery store owners, street vendors, 
coffee shops, and alcohol sellers did not have NPWP 
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put forward several reasons for not having NPWP and 
social security for their company, as explained below. 
"We receive very little information about NPWP 
and business licensing procedure. There is almost 
no correspondence between us as business 
communities and local government, and we don't 
understand the process [of acquiring NPWP]." 
(Grocery store 1).  
 The next statement showed business actors did 
not feel the need to get NPWP.  
"If information dissemination and mentorship 
continue on an ongoing basis, we as entrepreneurs 
will obey the laws as long as our business can 
expand in the future. Don't hamper tiny 
enterprises like us. At least provide us appropriate 
infrastructure and facilities." (Grocery store 2)  
 “For me, you know, [for] little businesses [like 
what] we operate, NPWP and business licenses are 
not that necessary. I think it is more vital to take 
care of medium and large enterprises. “ (Coffee 
shop 1). 
Another explanation why business actors did not 
wish to have an NPWP was the complex and long-
standing bureaucracy. This was mentioned by the 
following business actor.  
“The lengthy procedure and poor service make us 
hesitant to take care [of it].“ (Coffee shop 2)  
For business actors, the use of NPWP is an 
indicator that the business being run is officially 
operational. However, dissemination about the 
importance of NPWP for business actors was not 
carried out.  Business actors claimed that it was hard 
to obtain NPWP and considered it unnecessary, which 
became their justification to run an underground 
economy business. 
This study also confirmed the findings of 
Rothenberg (2016) who researched the informal 
economy sector in Indonesia. The market actors in the 
informal sector or the underground economy will live 
in an illegal position because they do not experience 
any loss due to the illegal status of their business. 
Fundamentally, the underground economy carried out 
by these local entrepreneurs will become a drain on 
the regional economy as well as on the national 
economy (Montenegro, 2010).   
As acknowledged by research respondents, these 
underground economic traders paid a retribution fee 
to run their business, including environmental cleaning 
fees and security charges. Several respondents 
asserted that these payments were indirect 
contributions intended for thugs rather than 
authorized officials (Williams, 2015). Rothenberg et al. 
(2016) stated that uncontrolled business involvement 
in the underground economy can have a negative 
impact on tax revenues, market dynamics, and 
productivity. In term of economic contribution, 
according to research respondents, these dark 
economy traders were likely to be able to run their 
businesses. The underground economy according to 
Williams & Horodnic (2017) creates a situation that 
can harm regional growth, regional income, and the 
capacity for corruption within the apparatus. The more 
widespread the corruption in an area, the more 
underground economic actors appear there (Wiseman, 
2015). The following findings confirmed this abuse of 
authority. 
“We have an insider to aid the process. We are 
ready to pay for the inducement if there is an issue 
so we are not too worried.” (Coffee shop 2) 
“We paid the levy to the officials. If an 
unannounced inspection takes place, they would 
notify us to get ready.” (Liquor producer 2).  
“We don't dare to argue with them because they 
include the local security apparatus, so we just pay 
them so they don't take over. “(Liquor producer 1) 
Qualitative research was performed to understand 
the role of the underground economy in the border 
area. The underground economy is all types of 
economic activity that are not registered and do not 
contribute to the account of a gross national/regional 
product or the regional economy, while their activities 
indicate that they are flowing and used for personal 
benefit (Strapuc & Hlaciuc, 2019). If we pay attention 
to the market situations of underground economic 
amid economic hardships created by the COVID-19 
pandemic, it was indicated that those business actors 
can still thrive, while in other circumstances many 
large-scale and legitimate business actors have 
suffered deficits. This is stated in the following 
statement.  
“During the crisis, raw material costs go up while 
purchase price stays down.” (Street vendor 1). 
 “I even sell, order and import alcohol from 
bordering areas, but no one has ever found out 
about it. “ (Coffee shop 2). 
 “The wine production number varies according to 
the demand, with 2,000 to 3,000 kilos of wine sold 
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This fact proves that underground business owners 
can run a company even during difficult times. Overall, 
the study results show that underground economy 
actors have the potential to support the economy of 
the region. This confirms the findings of research 
conducted by Rasbin (2013) that during the period 
2001 to 2013, the underground economy accounted 
for 8.33% of Indonesia's GDP. The scope for tax losses 
is also very high, exceeding 1% of Indonesia's average 
quarterly GDP. 
Research Implication 
The respondents in the underground economy 
revealed that the majority of them were hesitant to 
apply for a company license and to get a taxpayer 
identification number (NPWP) because it was difficult 
and they believed their operations were constantly 
watched. Workers were not included in welfare or 
social security programs since they were considered 
as economic players. It is believed that the low degree 
of ownership of work accident insurance and social 
security in Indonesia is affected by the education or 
conditions of the informal employees. In general, the 
number of participants in occupational accident 
insurance is low among unskilled employees in the 
underground economy, especially those who work in 
hazardous conditions (Madya & Nurwahyuni, 2019). 
Underground economic activity was carried out in 
cash transactions without going through the legal 
banking system. Hence, providing a payment and 
transaction processing digitization system is extremely 
helpful. This digitization system may connect various 
institutions such as tax agencies, commercial offices, 
community associations, police, and labor 
administration services. This integration may be in the 
form of creating big data with a robust server security 
system. Implementing big data processing may 
improve the life cycle of the collecting, processing and 
storing process. It can also provide links to support 
effective organization, improvement of data 
availability and processing speed, and reliable and 
secure data storage (Dobrolyubova et al., 2019).  
It should be noted that the underground economy 
research encompasses the complexities of the 
relationships and the characteristics of the actors 
concerned, rules of engagement, values, and culture 
that govern an economy (Dermawan, 2010). 
Legitimation by politicians enables the underground 
economy to maintain tax evasion and unethical 
behavior. Political influence and corruption create a 
societal culture that renders repressive powers 
ineffective (Nurunnabi, 2019). The fields of public 
administration and sociology dominate the study of 
corruption. However, economists have conducted 
significant research on this topic. According to the 
Transparency International Agency, corruption is "the 
misuse of delegated authority for personal gain." 
While the damage caused by corruption has long been 
studied, there is no evidence of its effect on inflation. 
Between 1995 and 2015, the relationship between 
corruption and inflation was examined for twenty 
countries. The findings indicated that high levels of 
corruption raise inflation rates and that a unidirectional 
causal link exists between corruption and inflation in 
ten countries (Ozsahin & Ucler, 2017). 
Although corruption and an ineffective judiciary 
will breach ethical standards and result in other 
negative consequences, they should not have to 
intensify social injustice. Additionally, while the 
judiciary's quality has a good connotation, it may 
indicate the polar opposite. However, we must stress 
that corruption and judicial accountability also have an 
effect on long-term development, which is why 
engaging in accountability and combating corruption 
would result in true success for the entire society. In 
general, these two considerations will also influence 
the quality of national balance data whether the rich 
gets away with corruption by diverting consumption to 
other countries or by engaging in unethical practices 
to conceal income and consumption from conventional 
measures. Furthermore, distributional reforms have 
no means of determining whether corruption and 
systemic transparency have an impact on social 
mobility levels.  When considering policy proposals 
aimed at combating graft and enhancing judicial 
transparency, it is critical to exercise caution of 
unintended consequences on high distribution margins 
(Berggren & Bjørnskov, 2020).  
The research findings show that underground 
economy business owners do not have permission 
from the tax authorities and reduce local government 
tax revenues. The reasons business actors do not 
register their businesses legally are because they do 
not have the expertise, do not trust, or do not want to 
deal with the complexity of legal arrangements by the 
tax authorities. Local governments should start 
collecting data and immediately implement programs 
to enable underground economic actors to run the 
economy legally and engage in official economic 
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tax revenues which will encourage regional economic 
growth. There should be socialization, assistance, and 
ongoing community preparedness about important 
information needed for sustainable regional growth 
(Ozsahin & Ucler, 2017). The enforced program needs 
to impose social sanctions in the form of annual 
reports on graft incidents and tax restitution. 
Enforcement of national policies is possible to build 
commitment and integrity of governance. There is a 
need for stricter regulations against perpetrators of 
corruption because corruption is contrary to human 
rights and contains a very significant political agenda.     
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
This study proves that business actors are 
reluctant to apply for and register business permits 
and taxpayer ID (NPWP) because of the complicated 
bureaucratic process. This is because they also lack 
knowledge and information about the needs and 
benefits of working legal businesses for the regional 
economy.  The underground economy actors prefer to 
pay the penalty illegally because this situation for them 
is more adequately handled. 
The performance of underground economic actors 
further shows violations of legal regulations, including 
tax evasion, providing wages below the regional 
minimum standards, not providing social assurance for 
workers, employing people beyond working hours, as 
well as paying illegal levies to certain people under the 
pretext of cleaning and security fees. 
The underground economic situation must be 
addressed immediately by changing the perspective of 
economic actors so that their activities bring benefits 
to company growth and contribute to the regional 
economy. Quality government governance will provide 
feedback from tax payments, and assist the business 
world with facilities such as micro business loans, 
adequate infrastructure and facilities, and taxes based 
on the capacity of business actors. 
This study suggests the implementation of an 
information technology-based financial system. A 
system that connects various institutions such as tax 
agencies, commercial offices, community associations, 
police and labor administration services. Implementing 
big data processing may improve the mechanism of 
the collecting, processing and storing process to 
prevent tax evasion and underground economic 
behavior. 
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